The Last Command () | The Criterion Collection
Back. Die Barrikaden von San Antone (The Last Command) (DVD) DE-Version Studio: 4 Front; VHS Release Date: 18 Jan. . NOT the Silent Movie by Sternberg, as the review elsewhere on this page suggests. Shop Online in India. I pursued my investigations online at websites and in books, including the of Holocaust survivors as well as the millions lost, Carl compiled and preserved He found Mueller's birth date and birthplace, which narrowed down my Between and Mueller was in and out of jail for what are described as . A thousand lights glimmering in an infinite range of shades from white to black; a thousand bales of silk, organza and net tulle; a thousand dunes, date palms.
Even Marilyn Monroe's ghost reportedly turns up, if you're into that sort of thing. Fairbanks and Academy vice president William C deMille elder brother of Cecil B deMille handed out the 30cm-high, 24 carat gold-plated britannium trophies they are gold-plated bronze nowwhich were still five years away from getting their Oscar nickname.
The big subject of the night was talking pictures. This was the last ceremony to include silent films exclusively. Fairbanks, a founding member of The Motion Picture Academy, who was known as The King of Hollywood, had a bleak film future ahead and his career rapidly declined with the advent of the "talkies". The talking picture development, begun with the Jazz Singer's famous line "You Ain't Heard Nothin' Yet", was about to revolutionise the industry, which had been in decline.
DeMille told the audience: It seems strange when you stop and look over the field and see how many talking pictures are being distributed today. Wings also won the most obscure award, for best engineering effects. FW Murnau's Sunrise was considered a dual winner for the best film of the year. Little changes in the world of Hollywood gossip: Getty Images The ceremony also wasn't the fashion extravaganza it has become.
The award winner for best actress, Janet Gaynor, who was 22 at the time, wore a small off-the rack dress with a Peter Pan collar she had bought some time before.
She won for all three roles in which she was nominated: The underlying assumption was that the closer the infantry hugged to the back of the barrage, the less time the defending enemy would have to recover and react when the leading attack wave reached the objective. Creeping barrages, phase lines, and rigid firing schedules, however, completely subordinated the infantry advance to the artillery plan. But, the communications systems of the period were inadequate for greater centralization of control, resulting in slower response times.
Thus, front line infantry commanders had no alternative but to ignore terrain in their planning, and they had less and less control of their immediate tactical situations. By the middle of the war, the basic principles of battlefield maneuver had largely been forgotten. Attack planning was reduced to fixed sets of mathematical formulae, a function of the numbers of heavy guns, machine guns, and riflemen per hundred meters of front in the primary attack sector, and the number of rounds to be fired during the artillery preparation.
By that stage of the attack, the leading infantry elements were totally spent and they did not have the mechanical means of mobility to continue the advance. The supporting artillery too was most likely firing at the maximum limit of its range, and did not have the mechanical means to displace forward.
For the attack to continue, therefore, fresh infantry units had to be moved up and the artillery somehow had to be brought forward over the shattered and broken ground, littered with the refuse of war. The only way for the infantry to move was by foot, and the artillery could only move with horses, which could only be worked so hard and were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire.
While that was going on, the defender, who was operating within his own lines, was able to reinforce the threatened area much more quickly by taking advantage of the roads and rail networks in his own rear area. The mission of these special groups was to infiltrate into the German lines ahead of the main attack, locate and neutralize the deadly German machine guns, and even probe deeply enough to disrupt the German artillery.
Laffargue's pamphlet at first did not get much serious attention from the British and French armies. The Germans, however, translated and printed a captured copy during the summer of The storm battalions were one of the earliest forms of a true combined arms task force. Typically, their structure included three to four infantry companies; a trench mortar company; an accompanying artillery battery; a flamethrower section; a signal section; and a pioneer combat engineer section.
Rohr's infiltration tactics, developed largely in a counterattack role, were eventually adopted as official German attack doctrine on the Western Front. In Septemberthe Germans successfully used the new tactics for the first time on a large scale at the Battle of Riga, on the Eastern Front. Instead of the typical attack formations of rigid lines advancing at a fixed pace, the German Eighth Army of General Oskar von Hutier attacked in fluid leaps and bounds.
One element moved forward while a supporting element provided fire cover. Then the two elements reversed roles and leapfrogged each other. Rather that being thrown in where an attack was faltering, reserves were committed only to reinforce and exploit success. The Germans used similar tactics during their successful attack at Caporetto the following month. The results of those two battles shocked the Western Allies, although for some time they failed to grasp the underlying tactical principles.
The Germans used storm-troop tactics on a large scale for the first time on the Western Front during their counterattack at Cambrai on 30 November It was followed by an aggressive exploitation of the attack characterized by decentralized execution and initiative on the part of the subordinate commanders. This phase began in the intermediate zone, beyond the range of the creeping barrage, substituting shock and audacity for fire support.
The new doctrine was based on infantry-artillery coordination, with artillery neutralization fire emphasized over destruction. The intent was to disrupt the enemy's communications, and bypass and isolate his strong points. The new tactics represented key conceptual shift from destruction to large-scale disruption. Artillery turned into a blunt instrument for hammering large sections of ground.
The main functions of artillery on the battlefield became destruction and annihilation—destroy the attacking enemy forces before they reached friendly lines; and destroy the defending enemy before attacking friendly troops reached the hostile positions. Artillery was expected to obliterate the enemy's fortifications and trench works, and even cut holes through the barbed wire in front.
The Germans on the Eastern Front especially, experimented aggressively with artillery tactics. The key to the new fire support thinking that started to emerge during was the idea that artillery fire was more effective when its tactical effect was neutralization rather than destruction.
While neutralization was a temporary effect, it only had to last long enough for the attacking infantry to take the objective. Thus, the evolving artillery neutralization tactics complemented the emerging infantry infiltration tactics.
Although preparations were not long, they were incredibly violent—designed not to obliterate a defending enemy, but to stun him senseless. A short surprise strike on command and control and communications targets; A period of reinforced fire against the enemy artillery; and attack in depth of the defender's infantry positions.
He managed to do this in the face of significant opposition from many of the hide-bound traditionalists in the German army. During the reinforced counter-battery phase of the preparation, however, the IKA guns joined in with the AKA guns to overwhelm the enemy batteries.
These units fired highly selective destruction missions against critical high-value targets, including rail centers, bridges, and concrete-reinforced command posts. Accuracy in artillery fire was, and still is, the principal technical challenge.
The primary way to achieve accuracy was to fire a registration against a target having a precisely known location. The system worked something like zeroing a rifle. The only problem was that in registering, an artillery battery gave away its position, and it usually became an instant enemy counter-battery target in the process.
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Also, hundreds of batteries suddenly registering in a given sector were a clear indicator that a major attack was in the works. The system, developed by Captain Erich Pulkowski ?? It could be done in a rear area, where the calibration firing could not be observed by the enemy.
They used the full version of the system in the remaining four of the offensives. The result was stunning tactical surprise. He did, however, perfect many of them on the battlefield, and he was the first to integrate them all into a comprehensive and devastatingly effective system.
French artillerymen, for the most part, were always several steps behind the Germans.
The Last Command (silent), Emil Jannings
They were slow to accept a return to neutralization, and to understand the value of surprise. Several British Gunners, on the other hand, had been advocating many of the same principles as the war progressed. For the most part, they were held back by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's prejudices on artillery, and the more rigid British staff system. The British attack at Cambrai actually pre-dated the Germans in the use of a system to predict artillery corrections without registering.
Technical errors in the application, however, produced mixed results.
Almost one hundred years after the end of the war the debate continues. What is clear is that the Germans were far slower than the Allies to recognize the potential of the new weapon system, and a number of factors contributed to this.
Even before the start of the war, the Germans had conducted trials with armored cars armed with light guns and machine guns. Committed in small numbers, they produced some initial surprise effect, which did not last long. The French first used them on 16 Aprilbut the results were bad because of poor terrain. The initial poor results led General Erich Ludendorff and many others at German Army Supreme Command Oberste Heeresleitung, or OHL to conclude that the tank was little more than a nuisance weapon that could be neutralized with the right tactics.
The German solution included special training for artillery crews, the construction of anti-tank obstacles, and the introduction of a 13 mm anti-tank rifle that required a crew of two to operate it. The first German tactical manual on tank operations, issued in Januaryclassified the tank as an auxiliary weapon that could not be decisive on its own.
Its primary mission, rather, was to support the infantry in reaching its objectives. Ludendorff thought that the primary functions of the tank were crushing enemy barbed wire and overrunning machine gun positions. Some of the General Staff officers at OHL, however, began to see the tank differently after the British committed them in mass for the first time at Cambrai on 20 November Only with the decline in discipline and the weakening of the fighting power of our infantry did the tanks in their mass employment and in conjunction with smoke gain a dangerous influence on the course of military events.
By the end of the war, the British had built 2, tanks and the French had built 3, Fuller argued that the Germans would have won the war in early if they had concentrated all their manufacturing resources on field guns and tanks. The important fact was how many operational tanks they had in action on the second and subsequent days of the attack. Tanks in were mechanically very unreliable. And, as the German experience against tanks increased, their anti-tank methods became more sophisticated and effective.
On the following day, were operational, and fifty of those were knocked out that day. By the third day, the French had only thirty-two operational tanks. BritainFranceAmericaGermanyand the Soviet Union all developed tanks during the interwar years.
But no matter how sophisticated and advanced a military technology may be, its effectiveness in actual war is a function of the tactics with which the hardware is employed. In hindsight, the lesson of concentration was clearly there to read from the September experience on the Somme. At the start of the war, airplanes were used for reconnaissance only. By the end of the war, all sides had purpose-built aircraft for reconnaissance, bombing, and air superiority roles.
Inthe Germans introduced the Junkers J-1, armed with three machine guns and a bomb load. It was both the world's first all-metal aircraft, and the first one specifically designed for ground attack and infantry close support. By Augustthe combined total was Throughout the war, the Germans produced some 47, aircraft of different types.
The Allies producedThe Germans countered Allied numerical superiority by forming larger units and concentrating their forces in the sectors where they needed local air superiority to support ground operations. The Germans consistently shot down between two and three Allied aircraft for each of their own losses. Training deaths accounted for 25 percent of the total German pilot losses, while in the Royal Flying Corps the figure was closer to 50 percent.
But most of the military functions of modern aircraft were in place by the end of World War I. The two exceptions were cargo aircraft and the helicopter. Between the world wars, transport, or cargo aircraft developed, and as their range and carrying capacity increased, the military airlift function expanded accordingly.
Transport aircraft also made airborne, or parachute troops possible. Introduced in the closing days of World War II, the helicopter initially was used for observation and transporting light loads into forward areas with no airstrips. By the Vietnam War, armed helicopter gunships took on much of the ground support function, and larger transport helicopters were capable of carrying troops directly into battle, replacing much of the function of parachute troops.
Between the world wars, different countries pursued alternate paths in the development of military aviation. Britain and the United States especially, followed the theories of World War I Italian General Giulio Douhet in developing large aerial fleets of strategic bombers.
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When World War II started, neither side had a properly balanced air force, but American industrial superiority enabled the Allies to correct the deficiencies during the course of the war. Effective, secure, and rapid communications are an essential prerequisite for the successful prosecution of modern war.
The real-time and near-real-time communications systems modern soldiers take for granted did not exist during World War I. Morse code and telephone voice communications by wire were fairly well developed, but radio was in its infancy. All armies made extensive use of non-electronic communications systems that had been in use for hundreds, if not thousands of years.
The faster electronic systems were more effective in the defense, the older and slower manual systems were more effective in the offense. This, especially, made responsive fire support difficult, as artillery observers moved forward with the advancing infantry and had no rapid means to coordinate with their batteries.
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The more primitive communications techniques were much slower, but also tended to be more reliable under combat conditions. Messengers, both foot and mounted, had the highest casualty rates of any job in the war. But, when multiple messengers were sent out with the same message, the system was generally reliable under fire. Both sides also made wide use of carrier pigeons and messenger dogs.
The dogs were very reliable within a two-kilometer radius. The pigeons were relatively uninfluenced by fire and gas, but they required clear weather and were only effective for front-to-rear communications. All sides tried various ways to exercise effective command and control over a wide area with the primitive and slow communications technology of the day. The Allies generally tried to centralize both planning and execution at the highest levels, which in the end robbed subordinate commanders of all initiative and made it almost impossible to exploit rapidly tactical opportunities as they arose.
The Germans also permitted their junior leaders on the spot far greater latitude in determining how to execute orders. That system developed into what today is called Auftragstaktik, generally defined in English as mission-oriented tactics.
In ground operations, radio made it possible for commanders to synchronize and control units spread over vast distances. It also reduced most of the reaction times necessary for artillery support, and gave fire direction officers the ability to mass fire from many widely spread batteries onto a single target, with devastating effect. In the air, radio communications made it possible for aircraft in flight to coordinate their actions, and to coordinate close support for troops on the ground.
When the HMS Dreadnought was launched init instantly made every other battleship in the world obsolete. Yet, byDreadnought-type battleships themselves were well on the way to becoming obsolete. When U-boats started attacking Allied shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, the Allies began to develop countermeasures resulting in the doctrines of modern submarine warfare and anti-submarine warfare.
Convoying emerged as the principal defensive technique, which would prove its worth to an even greater degree during World War II. Early research efforts into sonar which the British called ASDIC did not result in a deployable system bybut it did shortly thereafter.
Average U-boat life expectancy was only six war patrols. During the war, the Germans built U-boats, but by mid, they had lost Naval aviation started with battleships and cruisers carrying individual floatplanes for scouting purposes.
Launched from shipboard catapults, the aircraft mounted pontoons rather than standard wheeled landing gear. After returning from a patrol the aircraft could land in the water near the ship, to be recovered by a shipboard crane and placed back on the catapult for re-launch. On 4 Maythe first plane to take off from a ship underway flew from the deck of the pre-dreadnaught battleship HMS Hibernia.
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Before World War I ended, the first flat-deck aircraft carrier entered service. HMS Argus in was the first warship capable of launching and landing naval aircraft. All world-class naval fleets today are based on the submarine and the aircraft carrier. The purpose of tactics is to win battles. The purpose of strategy is to win wars.
The purpose of the operational art is to win the campaigns, which are based upon battles and which in turn contribute to strategic victory. Strategy and tactics have long been identified as distinct albeit connected spheres of military theory and action. The notions of the operational art and the operational level of war are of far more recent origin. The military theories underlying the operational art did not evolve uniformly; rather, they progressed sporadically over the course of the last two centuries.
In earlier times, it was often possible to win a war by winning a single decisive battle, what the Germans called the Vernichtungsschlacht the battle of annihilation. That became less and less likely as wars became larger and more technologically complex.
The experience of World War I dramatically demonstrated that single engagements no longer guaranteed the successful outcome of a campaign, and that cumulative tactical success was no guarantee of strategic success.
Instead of a coherent series of operations, each designed to build upon the success of the previous one, the Germans between 21 March and 15 July launched five separate large-scale attacks, each one intended to be the decisive battle that ended the war.